First off, I must begin with this disclaimer. In order for me to hold this theory that I am about to present before you in the following pages, I must state that my theory is not a claim from any knowledge based upon truth (in the rest of this essay you shall see why this is the case), but this is merely a claim from belief based upon reason and experience. I speak not from my knowledge, for as a finite man of limited perspective, I have lack of any knowledge from which to speak from.
With that out of the way let us get started.....
We Are Right?
That of Which We Know Not
Will Make Shadows of Our Light,
So How Do We Know
With What We Don’t Know
That Our Day
Is Not the Night?
How Is It
That
From Where
We Might Be Wrong
We Can Know
That
We Are Right?
If you are not a fan of poetry, then I apologize for not being traditional in this paper, but the poem came to me and it really expressed the ideas that I am about to expound on in a traditional form. With all these poems, disclaimers, and apologies, I seem to be stalling, so before stalling any further than I already have, lets begin.....
Section 1
I do not want to spend too much time on Socrates and his idea of wisdom, because I believe you are familiar with it, but I feel that it is necessary for me to indicate that his idea of wisdom is what I have adopted as a definition of wisdom for my own purposes in the pursuit of wisdom that is the subject of philosophy. Coming from the position of Socratic wisdom, I am troubled by the arguments for realism and epistemology which do not satisfy my appetite for wisdom. Firmly placing my belief in the idea which states, it is unwise to think I possess knowledge when in reality I am in lack of, I cannot be convinced of realism, for realism fails to provide any wise solutions to the epistemological problem of existence outside of sophism. I do not believe sophism is a splendid condition to be in, but it’s unbearable state does not justify the realist argument. It is a good thing that philosophers appeal to reason and not feelings, but even in their logic, they fail to appeal to my logic. I might be far too critical and well, as many in my position are called, skeptical, but I believe it is far wiser and more loyal to the philosophical quest of wisdom to always critique the ideas that are held as common knowledge when I have an idea that might be in closer proximity to wisdom and truth than that which is commonly taken for granted. The grand implications of my meta-philosophy, in regards to my pursuits therein, are that if what is held as commonly true is actually true, I will return in the end of my journey for wisdom to the very place I began. But if I should encounter what is actually true, then I will be under the deception that holds us all in common foolishness no longer. I believe before I can begin applying my solution to the problem of knowledge, I must first scrape away the sediment of those who came before me which inhibits those around me in their pursuit of wisdom.
I have a big problem with the realists Russell and Moore and this problem does not but hinder me in coming up with a solution to the bigger problem of knowledge. My problem with them is simple really, in light of what I believe is the true condition of man in regards to knowledge, I believe they are both wrong.
First, let us examine Russell. His idea that knowledge can be uncertain is preposterous considering that knowledge is having the right to be sure. According to a literal understanding of his novel idea, I can have an uncertain right to be sure. This makes not a bit of common sense, not that common sense sheds any sort of light on the distinction between truth and falsehood, but for trying to defend realism on the grounds that it is the most intuitive explanation for the existence of sense-data that bears evidence of an external world, he sacrifices any form of a simple definition for knowledge. Knowledge under the ramifications of his theory, is just as beneficial as no knowledge at all, thus he sheds light on the external world, but causes sight of it to be just as illegitimate as no sight at all in doing so. To Russell, one has the right to make a belief which is uncertain into a parcel of knowledge without ever finding what it is that transforms that belief into knowledge. The problem with this is, that although the limiting factor to this foolish practice is that the belief must be simple and correspond with a collection of other beliefs, one still stakes claim to rights that one cannot posses uncertainly.
The funny thing with Russell is I believe he did provide a situation in which the Platonic form of knowledge could be incorrect, but I do not believe that in his proving, Plato’s form of knowledge is capable of leading one into deception under the guise of knowledge, that he justified the illegitimate practice of staking claims of the right to be sure from an uncertain foundation of beliefs that all correlate and intuition which is not a far and distant cousin from Moore’s common sense. Russell grants individuals the right to build on sand and claim they are founded on rock.
I will not go too heavily into my refutation of Moore as I did Russell, for Russell is the more persistent ghost. Where Moore failed, Russell succeeded in granting us right that we do not have. Moore basically said we have a right to be sure because we are sure. That’s how the argument for him standing up and not dreaming appeared to me. If how I believe he presented his argument can be justified by its being the correct literal interpretation of his argument, then I in no way can see how all his common sense and claims there of to the irrefutability of common sense can make any sense because in his argument he appeals to no sense at all. How I can know that I am not dreaming because I am standing I believe stems from a sense that is a little too common and thus loses the critical astuteness that is nurtured by the pursuit of wisdom. With Moore, he builds on the sand and says it is rock because it would go against common sense to build on sand.
The surface is now dusted and I could continue my cleansing in more detail, but I believe you do not read right now in order to learn how others are wrong, but have come to hear what it is that I believe is right.
I shall begin with my first premise,
In order to be sure of anything, we must be sure of everything.
The premise is still the same if you replace “be sure” with the word “know”. I believe this is my most crucial yet most difficult premise to defend, it is the keystone to my whole theory because the following premise are simpler and less counter-intuitive, not that being in agreement with intuition is any indication in the soundness of an argument. This argument is much like Hume’s problem of induction, which if true, removes any and all capacity of knowledge, for anything we “know” in the light of everything still having the possibility of being incorrect. One possible counter-argument against the induction theory is that knowledge might not need to be true, but if those are the circumstances, then knowledge is no better than lack of knowledge, for if knowledge does not require any truth, then it is no different, other than name, from that of deception which is grounded in falsehood. The big problem might also be that one cannot believe or do any other action, for one cannot go beyond only belief in their very own existence. This was the hardest bridge for me to cross in accepting Hume’s idea. How can a thing experience it’s existence while not existing? Hume would say that the induction of existence causing experience would not be knowledge, and I would agree. However, although I cannot know I exist, I still believe I do, but I do so admitting that I cannot say that I know that I exist. This goes back into the idea of knowledge being “the right to be sure” and I do not believe I have the “right to be sure” of my existence simply because I belief based upon very solid evidence indicating that I do exist. The evidence could all be falsely based according to a fact that I might not encounter until the future or never at all in my lifetime. I have a sub argument for this premise that involves an evaluation of how our “knowledge” works in the frame of time, so I feel I need to leave this discussion for the sub argument. Anyhow, to move on, so that I can explain my argument as a whole, my second premise is as follows:
We are not sure of everything.
The version of this with the word “know” is “I don’t know everything.” I use the word “sure” in place of “know” because I want to be clear that people understand what my idea of knowledge is, which is the idea that it is “the right to be sure.” I really did not like the prospect of leaving any room for uncertainty in regards to what I define as knowledge. Knowledge, according to what I believe it is, cannot be a “right to be sure” while at the same time being uncertain. Again, I restate my former disagreements with Russell, but the clarity of the definition is vital to the pursuit of solving the problem of knowledge, or so I believe. Again, let me reiterate, Russell’s idea of knowledge with uncertainty creates a concoction that is detrimental to an individual, for in the case that there is anything that can be known at all, it is far better to have an empty mind open to what is true, than to have a mind full of deceptions and because of which closed off to what is true, or so I believe.
Anyhow, my second premise I believe is far simpler to defend than my first, but in light of the conclusion that it brings, it is a feat all in it’s own for anyone to defend anything from the foundation that it lays in the realms of the problem of knowledge. Yet I believe from this foundation much wisdom can be attained.
The big problem with this premise is that in order for premise one to lead to the conclusion, I must prove that premise two is not a statement that can be known. I do have a very tedious way of explaining how it is possible, but again like the qualms of the first premise, the qualms of this premise shall wait until the sub arguments for the premises are established.
My conclusion is this:
We are not sure of anything.
Challenging isn’t it? For if I am not sure of anything, how can I even fathom making any attempt at refuting those who are sure of things? Well, it is simple, I still am entitled to belief, for belief is not a claim of certainty thus I do not say in doing so that I am sure. So I can believe that others are wrong, just I cannot say I know that they are wrong. The philosophers before me have failed to see that their calling is not to solve the problem of knowledge, but to embark on the path that leads to wisdom. This, I believe according to Socrates, is discovering what it is that we do know, so that we may avoid being unwise in making assumptions about that which we don’t know. The problem, according to my conclusion, is that we don’t know anything. Thus, when paired with the Socratic idea of wisdom, the only form of wisdom is recognizing and believing that I have no knowledge. Also, I feel it necessary to indicate that the big emphasis is that I believe this and not that I know this, for I believe that, in claiming to know something that I only have right to believe in, I commit a transgression of foolishness against the very idea of wisdom.
Another issue I have to consider is whether wisdom can be possible without knowledge. The problem is, I do not know if wisdom requires knowledge, I believe it can be without, but that is as far as I am willing to go for the sake of sticking to the tenants of my argument. I have reasons to believe wisdom can be without knowledge, for if knowledge does not exist in our capacities, then wisdom has always been based on beliefs that, so far as the courses of time have granted to us any revelation, have not been false.
The problem is that mankind jumps from his belief, that something is true because it has not been shown to be false, to the conclusion that he knows it is true. My big question is: How does he know that his belief is not false? He doesn’t know, or so I believe, for he does not know the future, and what the future holds may or may not undermine the truth that his whole form of knowledge is founded on. So it is much like a man building his house on the a plot of ground that to him could very well be sand or solid rock, time will tell, and that is exactly what he is too impatient to wait for. The impatient builder has a 50/50 chance of being right, but that possibility of being right does not out weight the consequences of being wrong. He cannot know what the composition of his foundation is because time still has not told him and it is possible that it shall never in his lifetime relay to him that information.
Again this is all simply my beliefs, so maybe it is my beliefs that hinder me in accepting any form of knowledge, but I would rather believe what would lead to my wisdom over what would lead to my false knowledge and thus my deception. My goal is not to leave man without a direction, but to show that he has no certainty in his direction, but only makes guesses. Russell basically equated educated guesses to the right to be sure, yet I found I could not agree with this idea on the grounds that if they are guesses, educated or not, they are still guesses and not any right to be sure, for to be sure, a guess has to be sure, and to be sure in an uncertain manner seems no different than simply being unsure. So I strive with this argument to make the case for the validity of belief in a blatant manner by removing the ability to have “knowledge” of which it is believed to be the inferior. This contrasts with Russell’s attempt to validate belief by disguising it as knowledge, just uncertain knowledge. I believe that he added the uncertain bit because he was uncertain in his knowledge as to whether human knowledge could be sure. I could be said to “know” that human knowledge is not possible, but if I knew that, then human knowledge is possible. If it is possible, then there would not be any doubts about human knowledge, yet there are doubts about human knowledge, so how I can say that humans can be sure when they are unsure as to whether they can be sure, still evades me. But maybe it is just that I only believe we cannot be sure when we are unsure. I believe my idea makes logical sense, but I do not believe I can say that I know that this is the case.
You may notice that I keep saying “I believe” and you might be wondering how I know what and that I believe. The only thing I can say to this is that I believe that I believe this, but I believe that I can believe because I believe that I am right now in the act of believing, but I do not say this is knowledge because I believe it is possible that in the future a fact might show that I was not capable of any belief at all. I sound like a bumbling fool, but is not that the state of us all, for are we not all uncertainly sure of many things? I Believe, but do not know that I am a fool, for if I knew I was a fool and was a fool, I would make claim to what I do know and not to what I don’t, and that my friend, would be an act of wisdom.
Section 2
I really need to get to my sub arguments, for without any recollection of the whole of my theory, you cannot begin to attempt to understand and try to refute what it is that I claim from belief as truth. I have still more that I must not let remain unspoken, and you have been so kindly patient to withhold your rebuttals until I cease to continue to speak. So let us begin with the composition of my keystone, the most crucial, yet complex component of it all, my sub argument for premise one.
I must admit that my sub argument contains a vast amount of importance to my whole argument, so it is what I focused a majority of my thought on in this whole argument. That being said, there is much for me to cover about my first sub argument, but I feel that this is where I shall scratch beyond the surface of my petty introduction of premise one in my main argument. It is only through understanding the thoughts that brought me to premise one that you will be capable of grasping my first premise and hence my whole argument. Just to forewarn you, this will be lengthy, but I hope it will be more clear and to the point than my previous five pages. I apologize for this becoming a novella rather than an essay, but I am finding that old habits die slow and painful deaths. Let us hope that I do not find myself apologizing a hundred pages in the future for what will then form into a novel.
The first premise for my sub argument goes as follows:
If I am to “be sure” of anything, then I must “be sure” that I am not being deceived.
It is pretty straightforward, for if I cannot be sure that I am not deceived, then how is it that I can be sure of anything? I really cannot see a logical defense for being sure of anything while not being sure that one is not deceived. A way of looking at it is, one must know something is not a lie before they can say it is the truth. If I say it is the truth while I do not know that it is not the lie, then I might very well be passing on a lie as the truth, and therefore be passively lying pathologically and unconsciously.
This delights me, for I have found the way in which my ideas on truth and knowledge both intertwine, but I will get back to the subject at hand: knowledge.
The second premise is this:
I cannot “be sure” that I am not being deceived unless I am “sure” of everything, therefore..........
This might be objected to on the grounds that I can “be sure” that I am not being deceived while not “being sure” of everything, but I have a rebuttal to that objection in form of another argument:
A1. If I am deceived, then I cannot “be sure” that I am being deceived.
I believe there would be no disagreements here, for if I know I am being deceived, then how am I still under deception? I cannot both know that I am being deceived while at the same time remain deceived. I only know I was being deceived after I know how it was not truth but deception. So this is a pretty solid premise, so far as I believe.
A2. If I am sure about everything, then I cannot be deceived, therefore....
This again I will say is another solid point, the only thing is by sure I mean “know” not confidence or any other form uncertainty that can be mistaken for it’s antithesis. No, by “sure” I mean 100% solid, I am not wrong, I am right certainty. It is when I am sure about the objective truth because the line between what is objectively true and what I am subjectively sure of as true, is non-existent.
If I am 100% correct about everything, then I cannot be deceived. It is simple. If I can be deceived, then I am not 100% correct about everything. The problem might be that I do not know whether I am deceived while I have never yet been wrong. Could it be that, yes, I have been right about every possible thing I could be sure of up to this point, but could I be wrong about my being 100% sure of everything while there is more in the future that is in question?
My answer is yes, and most likely, you are wrong. This simply means that you were wrong about knowing everything, because you were not sure that you were right in everything that you were sure of. You might of had all the right answers, but the primary answer to whether all these answers are wrong, outside of your subjective experience of being right, was still unknown to you, thus you did not know all when you thought you did.
The conclusion to my rebuttal argument is therefore:
A3.In order to “be sure” that I am not being deceived, I must “be sure” about everything.
The pairing of both my sub argument and my rebuttal argument defending my second premise of the sub argument form the complete picture of what I believe is the foundation to my argument as a whole, for knowledge requires it not being deception and if knowledge cannot be deception then everything must be known in order to know in that one’s knowledge is not deception. It is pretty clear and straight forward, for how is it that one can know anything is not a deception if they do not know first that everything is not a deception? The fact is that I believe they can’t. Again, this is an assumption and not something that I know is not possible, but my goal is again not to prove I know anything, but on the contrary to show that I and everyone else know nothing. With that said, I still am not out of the park just yet.
There is one more problem with my sub argument and that is there might be a paradox, but allow me to navigate you out of this unsolvable complexity with a solution to the paradox.
The paradox is as follows:
Can one be sure that they are unsure about everything?
To show the details of the problem, I shall put it in argument form:
If I can “be sure” that I am wrong about everything, then I can “be sure” that I cannot be right about anything.
I can “be sure” that I am wrong about everything, therefore....
I can “be sure” that I cannot be right about anything.
The problem is if I can be sure that I am wrong about everything, then I am right in something because I am right that I am wrong in everything, but if I am right in something, then I am not wrong in everything. And if I am not wrong in everything, then I can be right about anything. Now, if I can be right about anything, then I cannot be wrong about everything, but the thing of which I was right about in the first place was being wrong about everything, which by being sure it was right, I come back full circle to being wrong, which means I am right and the whole thing starts over again.
How I solve this is with an “If and only if” statement. It is possible for one to be wrong about everything if and only if it is impossible for one to be sure that they are wrong about everything.
In argument form it is as follows:
If it is possible for one to be sure that they are wrong in everything, then it is impossible for one to be wrong about everything.
It is impossible to be sure that one is wrong in everything, therefore.....
It is possible for one to be wrong about everything.
It is impossible to know without a doubt that one is wrong about everything, for in order to know that everything is wrong, they must know that something is right, but if they know that everything they know is wrong, then they also know that they have nothing that is right prove that they are wrong.
So a man maybe fully wrong, but he will not be able to prove it, for if he does, then he is not fully wrong, and therefore he is wrong in saying he has proved that he is fully wrong.
Another way of looking at this problem is as follows:
If I can know that I don’t know everything, then this could mean that I can know anything or something without having to know everything. The thing is I could really know everything and just not know that what I know is everything. This would then mean that I don’t know everything because I did not know that I knew everything. Since I do not know everything because I do not know that everything I do know is everything, I don’t know anything because since I don’t know that everything I do know is everything, I am deceived into thinking that I don’t know everything when really everything I do know is everything. This deception is a false belief that I misplace as knowledge. It is uncertain because it is unsure as to whether all I know is everything, but it is also true because I do not know everything, if I did, I would know that I know everything. What doesn’t make it knowledge is that it is uncertain, and if it were certain, it would become false because everything I know is everything, thus it would be false knowledge. Knowledge cannot be false. Only beliefs can. If knowledge did not have to be true, then there would be no difference between knowledge and belief other than name, and both would be equally capable of deception. Thus one with knowledge can be as easily deceived as one with belief. The problem is if knowledge as in “the right to be sure” is vulnerable in anyway of deception, then it is not knowledge, for it is not “the right to be sure” if one who possesses knowledge can be deceived. This means that all we believe is knowledge would really be merely strong beliefs. There is not any knowledge unless it is sure and it cannot be sure if it is uncertain.
You might wonder how I can say all this and claim that I cannot make any claims because under this theory I have no right to knowledge, but only believe. From an uncertain ground, how can I claim that I am certain that knowledge cannot be uncertain?
It is simple, I am not claiming that I know knowledge has to be certain, I am simply claiming that your knowledge that knowledge can be uncertain is equal to my claim that it is just a strongly held belief. I am also claiming that I believe my idea to be wiser and thus more philosophical. I believe it is far wiser to be humble in light of what I am not sure of, than to be confident in the light of what I am sure of, for in light of what I am not sure of, what I am sure of could be nothing at all.
Here’s two arguments for this idea:
1.If I can be wrong about something, then I can be wrong about anything.
2.I can be wrong about something.
3.I can be wrong about anything.
Where as...
1.If I am right about everything, then I cannot be wrong about anything.
2.I am not right about everything.
3.I can be wrong about anything.
These arguments are what actually lead me to my paradox, but the problem with using right and wrong is that in regards to belief, we are capable of right or wrong, but in regards to knowledge, we can only be right, for anything else is deception. So while I am saying it is possible for us to be right in saying things that we claim to know are actually true, I am saying it is not our right based on what knowledge we are in lack of to say that we know our claims are actually true. So we could be right, but we only have the right to believe we are right because we are only capable of belief and not knowledge in light of the certainty of our central truth from which all our truths follow. Thus if we cannot be sure about what the truth is objectively, then we cannot determine whether or not or subjective truths are any truths at all.
With this in mind, it is not that I know it is wiser to suspend judgement until all doubt is gone, but it is that I believe it is wiser. My point is that your knowledge of it being wiser to make judgement with there still being doubt, is not any different than my belief, it is just that because I do not know for sure if my belief is true, I do not say I know it is true, and thus I avoid jumping to knowledge from uncertainty in other areas.
I have a thought experiment to illustrate this idea of the foolishness that is associated with jumping from belief to knowledge without certainty.
Am I Safe?
Lets say that I make myself as safe as physically possible within the known universe.
Now lets call this the 3rd dimension. So I am as safe as physically possible in the 3rd dimension, the only universe that is known. I actually know I am safe correct? For I know there is a 3rd dimension and in that dimension I am safe. I can say that I know I am safe. I believe I am safe, I am certain as far as I am capable of being certain that I am safe. I am 100% sure that I am safe. I cannot die, for I have all the provisions needed to guarantee my safety. We can even stretch this into saying that as far as the 3rd dimension goes, I am not capable of death.
But then I die.
How is it that I can die when it is impossible for me to die in the 3rd dimension?
I did everything possible, I was safe, 100% certain I was safe. There was no way that I could possibly die. No one could come in to my impenetrable lair and kill me. Also, I was immune to all forms of disease. I was immortal in all the ways that are physically possible. I knew that in everything, I was not going to die in anyway. How is it that I died?
I was killed by what I did not know.
I did not know that waiting for me in my 3rd dimensional impenetrable lair was an assassin from the 4th dimension. He is who killed me. I knew everything about my safety in the 3rd dimension, but I did not know that there was more than a 3rd dimension, thus I did not know a thing at all about my safety. What I did not know in the the 4th dimension, lead to my knowledge defying death in the 3rd. In what I believed I could be sure of, I was vulnerable. In the 3rd dimension, I, like all in the 3rd dimension, cannot but only believe that I am safe, for what lies beyond everything I am capable of knowing is unknown.
This lack of knowing what is possible to know is only a complete picture of how we cannot know anything without everything when it is paired with what shows that even our current knowledge can be nullified by what is unknown in the future.
I believe I need to indicate some key terms in my idea, for there is a need to account for what you call knowledge, and for what convinces us into believing we have the right to call it knowledge.
First off, I believe you would agree with me that the future is unknown, that is unless you are omniscient, but most likely you are not.
Secondly, I also believe that things we believe we know in the past and present, are sometimes clarified in the future, thus making what we knew in the past and present false knowledge and thus deception.
So, thirdly, I believe that a grounds for saying we cannot know anything based on the past and present because we do not know the future is a sound argument.
Now you may wonder what it is I believe we mistake for knowledge in the present and past. I call it Bowidk, which is literally, “Based on what I do know.” Now here is the thing, I use the word “know”, but what I mean by that is present experience and reason. So here are my arguments for why Bowidk does not suffice for the authority to grant the right to be sure.
1.If Knowledge based on what I presently know might turn out false in light of what I presently don’t know, then it is unwise to say that I have knowledge based on what I presently know.
2.Knowledge based on what I presently do know can be false in light of what I presently don’t know, therefore...
3.It is unwise to say that I have knowledge based on what I presently know.
Now from in this argument, I have shown what is illegitimate about Bowidk, but I still must present Bowidk in order to show how all that we consider knowledge is Bowidk.
Bowidk is essentially the predominate experience from finite perspective that inhabits the most imminent moment in time. In this state, the past can only be experienced through the assessment of memories of the the past and documentations of the past. These records of the past do not inhabit the past that they are records of, but only exist in the immediate moment of which they are subject to the experience of an individual, for if something is experienced in the present, it currently inhabits the present and not the past, although it could have existed in the past. This past existence cannot be proven from a perspective of the immediate present as I shall next explain.
A record of the past cannot establish in the present, the certainty of it’s having existed in the past, for it currently exists in the present only and one can only induct that it is from the past, but cannot from the present establish this claim as certain.
Thus if records cannot attest to their own existence beyond that of the immediate past or immediate future, then an individual cannot use the illegitimate testimony of records to establish their case for possessing any knowledge of the past. In other words, they cannot prove they have knowledge of the past if they cannot prove that what they base their knowledge of the past on, while in the present, is from the past.
The idea of Bowidk debases any knowledge of the past from within the present because knowledge of the past within the present relies on records of which their existence can only be established within the present. The attempt can be made to use the content of information regarding the past to prove a document or memory are legitimately of the past, but that cannot be extended to establish that a record is from the past.
Two documents that seem to appear from different time periods both are equally capable of being from the present, for they both currently reside in the present.
For example, the constitution, signed and dated in the 1700s has the same contents of a contemporary replica of the constitution. Both being in the present are equally capable of having come from the past based on the appeal to the idea that appearance of age and dated content means a document existed also in the past.
The same goes for our memories, for since we presently have them, we cannot say we remember that we had them in the past. We can try to say that since they are of the past that establishes their having been from the past, but whereas both an original constitution and an perfect replica have the same exact contents, and the origin in regards to time between those two documents would be indistinguishable. It is the same case with memory, for a memory of locking the car five years ago has the same content as a memory of locking the car an hour ago. The difference might be the content in regards to background, but those differences only give us the right to believe that they are from two different times, but not to be sure. The reason we cannot be sure is that our memories as far as details can be faulty. Also, even if I have a memory of being five and one from when I was ten, I do not have the right to be sure that those memories establish my having existed longer that a moment, for that is simply a belief that I have that having memories equals having existed longer than a moment. If memories were an indication of anything, then I cannot claim that I was an infant, for all I know of my being an infant are external things such as memories of those around me and documentation. There is nothing internal that indicates I existed before my first memory. The only thing internal might be my body, but I cannot induct that my having a body right now meant I had a body in the past. Therefore, my body and existence in the past cannot be certain because I am aware of my existence in the present.
The flaw with having Bowidk is that even if we can know our past, we still are incapable of knowing our future, thus we still have the possibility of being wrong about our past and present based upon what events in the future possibly affecting that which we claim to know in the past and present.
I have another thought experiment to illustrate this:
Bob
A guy may say "I am Bob" to another man, but all that other man can know is that the other "said, 'I am Bob'". Bob may very well be Joe, but in the other man's world Joe is Bob because Joe said he was Bob not because he is Bob. The other man cannot know for certain who he thinks is Bob is actually Bob, he can only believe what "Bob" tells him(sense-data). So the truth is "Bob" is actually Joe, thus in Joe's "world" he is only Joe pretending to be "Bob", but in the other man's "world" Joe is "Bob". So in this light, truth seems to be subject to who is speaking, for Joe knows that he is Joe, but says he is Bob and the other man says that Joe is Bob because he "knows" that he is Bob. The problem is really the other man believes Joe is Bob, but he assumes this belief into knowledge, thus he "knows" Joe to be Bob not Joe. Whereas Joe knows he is Joe, but everyone else "knows" he is Bob because he says he is Bob. Joe does not even know for sure that he is Joe, for He may be Bob since everyone calls him Bob. Joe only "knows" based upon his past experiences of answering to "Joe". It could be that "Joe" is truly Bob, but he as Bob had amnesia and his first new memory is of being called Joe, thus to him, he is Joe. The only problem now is why would formerly Bob who now goes by Joe say he is Bob? Joe may be attempting to disguise himself as Bob, so he says he is Bob and the other man "knows" him as Bob because Joe says he is Bob. Now Joe runs into a man named Jack who knew him first as Bob. Joe says," hi I'm Bob." Jack says,"Yes I know you are Bob." Joe is surprised by Jack saying, "I know you are Bob." because Joe to his knowledge has never seen Jack in his life, yet Jack has seen him many times before when Joe was Bob. Joe at risk of blowing his cover investigates into how Jack knew him as "Bob" before they had ever met before, “How do you know me as Bob?” Jack then says, "We are neighbors, Bob." Joe is baffled by this and tells Jack the truth, "I lied to you, I am Joe, not Bob. I've never seen you before." Jack then confused by his neighbor's attempt at telling the truth says, "I don't know what you are talking about Bob, you are not Joe, you are Bob and we are neighbors. You and I live on Athena street. Your address is 3571." Joe then reaches in his wallet and puts forth his ID and it says Bob Walters, and the address reads 3571 N. Athena street. So Joe is left doubting the evidence in his wallet and Jack's memories in favor of his own. What is true to Joe is that he is Joe pretending to be Bob, what is true to Jack is Bob is Bob who thinks that he is Joe, and what is true to the other man is that Bob is Bob. In all this is a tangled web of four men's contrasting perceptions. Some would give up and say Joe is Joe, but Bob to everyone else, thus truth is subjective, but the truth maybe objective, only everyone has a subjective perception of it.
We, as the reader of this experiment, seem to have all the pieces put together, but we cannot use this apparition to establish that those in the experiment can reach the conclusions we seem to have come to in our reading of their situation. We are outside looking in, so of course we can see what the details of the situation are and possibly have convictions in regards to who Bob is, but again this is a liberty that those inside the situation do not have. The literary term for what I have just illustrated with this experiment is third person omniscient. Our problem in reality that is reflected by this fiction is that we do not have any third person omniscient perspective in our own existence, so we cannot be sure of things just because we are told them or because we remember them just as the characters in the story.
It is in being sure of everything that we can be sure that we are sure in anything. This is the closest that I will ever come to making a claim of knowledge, for so far as I have come in my journey through life, this has not been illogical, but even still, I cannot say that I know, for I myself have never been omniscient, so I believe, but it could very well be I once was omniscient and now have amnesia, I’ll never know, and even then I might later find out in what lies ahead in the future. It could also be that I do know everything that can be known right now in this very moment, but again this is another close approach I will make to a claim of knowledge, yet, I am free to be wrong, thus only be deceived, so I can say, that I don’t know everything when in fact I do because I can believe something and be wrong. And also being able to be deceived means that I don’t know everything, so I may know every factual thing, but I don’t know that all my knowledge is actually all there is to know. So it is like a dog continually chasing it’s tail in that I am searching for what I’ve had all along.
I believe I might of repeated myself somewhere, but if I did, it was because in my mind I felt unclear as to what I meant, so it is more for me than for the reader when I clarify, but I do believe the reader can benefit from the author making himself more clear.
Section 3
Anyhow, I do need to refresh you with my first premise and the sub argument so that you can see from what you have just read that I have established my points and that I can move on to the next portion of my argument.
1.If I am to “be sure” of anything, then I must “be sure” that I am not being deceived.
SA1.If I am to “be sure” of anything, then I must “be sure” that I am not being deceived.
SA2.I cannot “be sure” that I am not being deceived unless I am “sure” of everything, therefore..........
Rebuttal defending SA2.
A1. If I am deceived, then I cannot “be sure” that I am being deceived.
A2. If I am sure about everything, then I cannot be deceived, therefore....
A3.In order to “be sure” that I am not being deceived, I must “be sure” about everything.
SA3.Conclusion:I must “be sure” of not being deceived in everything in order to “be sure” of not being deceived in anything.
So now with that out of the way, I will move on to my second sub argument.
My second argument was actually covered a bit in the first discourse of my first sub argument. This means that you are familiar with some of what I would say in regards to my second argument for my second premise. So this shall not be as long winded as the first part of this essay, or so I believe. First, let me introduce you to my second argument for my second premise. It is as follows:
1.If I have to use reason, then I do not know all.
2.I have to use reason, therefore....
3.I do not know all.
In addition to this, I feel another argument is necessary:
1.If I have yet to experience anything, then I have not experienced all.
2.I have yet to experience things, therefore....
3.I have not experienced all.
The reason I add this second argument is that it ties in with the bowidk idea. In this argument this is the closest I come to having knowledge is finding it hard to doubt that I have not experienced all and that I do think. I need to show you how it is possible that I don’t think and have experienced all while not knowing it in order to show this does not conflict with the second premise in the form of a paradox. First off, not even Descartes could doubt thought, so this problem of mine is difficult to overcome and maybe I underestimated this second premise. The only thing I can say is, “How do I know that what I am engaged in is thought?” “Well, you are using your brain to reason.” might be an answer. Or “An idea popped in to your head.” could be another. I could try to say that this paper is evidence that I think, but that is an induction. The problem with induction is it is betting, betting one’s certainty on the chance that in the long scheme of things they will never be wrong, but still this is a bet and a bet, although confident is not sure, thus not knowledge, but belief. So how do I know that I am thinking, I don’t, I only believe based on the substantial evidence in front of me and within me. “I am thinking therefore I am” assumes not only that I exist because I am thinking, but also that the reason I am using to realize that I am reasoning is sufficient evidence to support the idea that I can realize that I am in an act of reason, but just because I may appear to be reasoning, does not give me the right to say I know that what looks like reason is reason, for the reasoning that I use to determine that is what is in question of not existing in the first place. I cannot induct using my reason, that because I look like I am reasoning that I actually am reasoning. I am capable of giving off the appearance of reason even in my dreams, such that there are decisions that I will make in dreams that seem to be flawed reason to my third person omniscient perspective within the dream. Without that third person perspective in reality, I cannot know that my reason is sound or even that I have reason at all. For all I know, I could be an unconscious observer, not thinking my thoughts, but receiving my thoughts from elsewhere. I could be without any control and not ever realize. I could be without consciousness and not even realize it, for this could be a strong dream in such a way that even my taking in of the dream is part of the dream, even awareness of the internal perspective that I have, the being aware of sense-data and my imagination could very well be a dream. I am not capable of knowing the answer to these questions, for the means through which I would arrive at an answer is in question. Based on what I have believed that I have been through, I have not run into an area in which I can doubt that I am thinking, but I have not been through everything, so I cannot but only say I believe and do not know that there is not a possibility of doubting one’s own possession of thought, for to say I know would speak on unknown knowledge that I do not have. And unless I have everything settled, I cannot begin to settle things, for I could make mistakes and thus always be unsettled about the matters which I believe I have settled.
Experience might be trickier to navigate. When we say we have an experience, we mean that we observe with our senses and that we have a picture in our head of what our senses tell us. I believe it is easy to doubt that what the senses tell us could be true, but I do see it being hard saying that I am not sure the senses are not saying anything. Experience maybe momentary, but it is hard to doubt that it could possibly not exist. Again, what I have to keep in mind with the suspension of certainty is that I cannot be certain unless I am certain in all that there is experience. I really think that the saying “seeing is believing,” goes into this. I might have an experience, but I cannot but only believe that I had an experience, for although it is possible to believe something is right, I cannot know what the verdict is until all the evidence is in. And I cannot know if all the evidence is in until it is all in, but again, even then I will not know when all the evidence is in unless I know that there is no more evidence. When I know that there is no more evidence to assess, it is then that I know all. The problem is that I cannot reach the status of knowing all the evidence is in from the status of not having all the evidence, for if I begin with an incomplete picture, I will never be able to say that there is not more to add, whereas if I have the complete picture, I can know that I have the complete picture because there is not anything else to add. If there were something more to add and I did not know this, I would mistake the incomplete picture for the complete. The only way I know something is complete is if and only if there is no way to add to it, for if it is complete, everything will be there and you cannot add anything to everything unless what you believe is everything is not actually everything.
So the reason that I do not know all, because I still have to reason and experience, I believe is pretty easy to grasp in that often reason being applied to experience is considered as the way we gain knowledge, thus if we are still taking part in that process, then we do not have all knowledge, for if we did, we would not be engaged in gaining knowledge, but in having knowledge. I am saying that we hungry only when we are hungry and it is not that we are hungry because we are fed. We currently are engaged in gaining knowledge thus we cannot say that we have knowledge, for if we had knowledge, why would be engaged in gaining it? I find this idea highly undoubtable, but because my reason which does not allow me to doubt this could be wrong in the light of everything, I am not certain that this is the case. The irony of my position is that there are things of which look without a doubt to be true, but I can only believe that and not know it because I do not know everything, even my having to know everything to know anything is based upon that condition.
So maybe this is all a lie, and I truly do know what I do know without knowing everything and I am just being critical. I have a problem with this notion, it is still a maybe and not sure. I have to be sure in order to be sure, and being 99.9% sure is not sure, it is just very close to sure, but still uncertain. So I cannot know unless I am certain by a whole.
This doubt can be shown in the form of another, probably more convincing argument for how I do not know all.
1.If I am sure of all, then I cannot be deceived.
2.I can be deceived, therefore....
3.I am not sure of all.
I believe I can be deceived, but this again is only because I believe what my memories tell me of the past. My idea that I cannot be deceived also again comes from my logic, but I do not know, for I speak from a position of partial knowledge, and not complete knowledge, thus I cannot say I know this or anything at all. I cannot do this because I believe it is unwise. It is absurd for one to say that from a mountain that one can see well if they have not ever been on a mountain. It is from my vantage point on the ground that I believe it would be the best view from the mountain, but I do not know this. I could very well be deceived into believing that there is a better vantage point other that the vantage point that is mine, because I am speaking from what I believe I can be sure of from my vantage point. The other side of this idea is that from the ground we can see better than on the mountain, but my idea makes more sense to me although, I cannot say I know it is true unless I have been on the mountain. The truth might be that the view from the mountain is not better than my view from the ground because a higher vantage point might not make up for my nearsighted vision. The problem for us all is that if we try to climb the mountain, we end up stopping before the top, for the top can only be reached if one starts out there, or so I believe from what I can tell on the ground. Those who stop before the top often do so because they think that where they are is the top and even when one might reach the top, who’s to say that the mountain is the highest of all plausible vantage points, for there still is the sky. My message is that we can keep going higher and higher, but in the end we chase our tails, for we seek that which we cannot attain in increments, but only in one infinite gulp.
Section 4
I believe I segwayed a bit into my conclusion there, but let me recap my whole argument thus far.
In order to be sure of anything, we must be sure of everything.
If I am to “be sure” of anything, then I must “be sure” that I am not being deceived.
I cannot “be sure” that I am not being deceived unless I am “sure” of everything, therefore..........
Rebuttal defending SA2.
A1. If I am deceived, then I cannot “be sure” that I am being deceived.
A2. If I am sure about everything, then I cannot be deceived, therefore....
A3.In order to “be sure” that I am not being deceived, I must “be sure” about everything
C.Conclusion:I must “be sure” of not being deceived in everything in order to “be sure” of not being deceived in anything
I am not sure of everything.
A1.If I have to use reason, then I do not know everything.
A2. I have to use reason, therefore.....
A3. I do not know everything.
Conclusion: I do not know anything.
The ramifications of my idea are simple, we do not know anything, so anything we claim to know is simply belief. The only reason for this distinction is that it is unwise to say one is sure when one is not sure, and since we are without all knowledge, we cannot be and are not sure of anything. We are not even unsure that we are unsure, for it is possible that we can know something without everything, but the truth behind this possibility which would transform from a possibility to a certainty is unknown, for we do not know everything, and from only some knowledge, we would only be able to test one side of the experiment, which would mean that our knowledge that partial knowledge is possible is based upon incomplete knowledge. This I believe is not wise at all, yet if I said I know it is not wise, I would be guilty of the same mistake, but I pardon all my statements, true and false with the words “I believe”, for they require no certainty, and I have no certainty to spare in effort to allow me to speak and live otherwise. By saying I know things, I spend money I do not have complete backing for, thus I end up building credit against me, which may someday lead to my being in debt to what really is true, for the sake of all the lies that I perpetuated as true from my unstable economic standing in the currency of knowledge. I borrow what is not mine and I owe to who it is that I borrow and in this case, I owe the claim of knowledge that was never mine to what is actually knowledge in light of the truth. That is the dilemma of man, in order to live, he must believe something, and no one is capable of being completely debt free unless he has all the money, for eventually, he will run out of the currency that is knowledge when he goes deeper and deeper into his beliefs and finds hidden bills of assumed knowledge under his beliefs. We cannot avoid being in debt through our subject and finite perspective to the objective truth. We can only pretend that we do not know that there is no objective truth, but that means we believe there is no objective truth, not that we know that there is. And to say that we know there is no objective truth contradicts itself, for it banks on the very idea that it claims is non-existent. It does not matter if everyone disagrees with the truth, for that will simply mean that everyone is deceived . We may collectively as one mass work together to gain knowledge, but even all our knowledge put together can be wrong in the light of all knowledge. We can only know anything when we know everything. I can know something will never be wrong if and only if I can never be wrong about everything, for if I can be wrong then I cannot know that anything I know is never wrong and thus I cannot be sure because I can never move from sand to solid ground. I only highly believe that this is true, but I have not yet deciphered everything that is true from everything that is false, so I cannot be 100% sure even though I believe strongly in its truth, for objective truth can careless about the subjective opinions of man not matter how undoubtable they seem. A man never doubts when he is deceived, for in his doubt is his first step out of deception, but who’s to say that he does not step out of one hole and into another. Again this is all what I believe from my perspective on the ground.
If I were omniscient, then I would know all, thus I would not have to reason to uncover all truth, for from the start I would have all truth else I would not be omniscient. If I know all truth, then what I know as truth could never turn out to be a lie, for there is no event in time or place that I have not know, so in order for me to be omniscient, I must be omnipresent in every time and place. If what I consider knowledge can never be a lie, then I can never be deceived, for how can one who can never be wrong not be right about something?
The issue is, that I am a man, thus I do not have knowledge of the future and my perspective is finite and subjective. Thus since I have to use reason, I do not know all. Since I do not know all I can be deceived. Since I can be deceived, I cannot decipher whether what I have is knowledge or deception. Thus in order to know that my knowledge is not the source of my deception, I must know all.
In this condition of no knowledge, it is impossible for mankind to even begin to comprehend his lack of knowledge in the things he is most sure of, for the whole course of his history has been an attempt at closing off this gap between omniscience and no knowledge that is insurmountable by the limited conditions that are inherent to man. We may continue for eons and eons to push the rock of what we know up what we think is a traversable hill, but our failure seems inevitable, for the barrier between having to think to know and instant knowledge is not a mere hill but an insurmountable mountain in the way of man’s route to knowledge. Someday, he will end up in over his head and the rock of what he is sure of will come tumbling down because he will lose sure and certain footing, thus taking him with it back to where started to start over again.
The big question I want to address is what if we are in contact with an omniscient being. We who are not capable of omniscience, will only be able to believe and not know whether or not an omniscient being is truly omniscient. But if omniscience is required in order to have all knowledge, then I believe that it would not be a foolish idea for a person without knowledge to listen to one who does. The difficulty in this lies in that we do not believe we lack any and all knowledge, thus it is possible that in our faith in the lie that we have any knowledge is truly our deception, through which we are deceived by ourselves. A fool may be a fool, but fools are still capable of deceiving anyone as long as they are not as wise, which in the case of the fool is any fool, even himself. Anyhow, if there is an omniscient being, then I believe he would be wise to follow, but the difficulty is that although man is capable of believing what it is the being says is true, he cannot know through his own accord that it is true, so he cannot truly test whether the being is telling the truth or even exists when it comes to the grounds of knowledge. I will not be coy, I am referring to God. We cannot prove God, but we also, cannot disprove Him, for just as it is likely He doesn’t exist because we cannot sense Him, it is as equally likely that He does exist outside our ability to sense Him. The proofs against God all stem from being sure of the external world existing, but if we are uncertainly sure that the external world exists, then we are not sure that the proofs against there being a God exist also. I believe I have indicated that we are, yes, uncertain, but can be nothing else beyond uncertain about everything and thus cannot be certain about anything. I believe the problem on the lowest level is that man is not capable of ending his fallacious assumptions, I even find it hard to avoid assumptions and in this very statement I make assumptions and in my indicating that I make assumptions. So since we can only at the root of our knowledge begin with assumption, we cannot say that we are sure, for certainty is not founded on what is assumed, but what is known or is certain. Knowledge comes only from certainty and certainty only from omniscience. I believe that God has a better stance from which to testify to His existence, than we do in declaring His non-existence, for we speak from only an assumption, and He, if He is truly omniscient, speaks from certainty.
I do not defend the idea that we can know that there is a God, I am just merely saying that my belief in a God would not be inferior to knowledge of the world’s existence, which is used to disprove the existence of God. This again is only what I believe, but I base this belief in my logic which is also the key component is used to acquire knowledge, so we both have logic. It is just that I am being honest about my logic only being able to grant me the the right to belief, for my logic can be flawed, which is an issue that man’s claim to knowledge ignores illegitimately. I will say it is easier to believe there is no God based on the external world than to say opposite, but simplicity is not what distinguishes truth from falsehood. If truth were what is simpler, then spontaneous generation of flies from meat would be true in contrast to the reproductive cycle of flies being responsible. The problem with mankind is again, we lack the patience and the ability to wait for all truths to be revealed to us by time, and even then, time might not ever end, so we might not never be able to add up all the facts in reality if they never cease to come into existence. The other issue is, we as humans may get all the facts that chronologically are possible, but we do not know how many dimensions there are to explore, thus we might learn all about our warehouse, but then find the door and open it to a vast insurmountable city.
In all, I believe that we do not know anything, thus all we have left is belief. Belief is not a bad thing, for sometimes it defies what we think we know. For example, we think we know that no one could possibly walk on water or rise from the dead, but how do we know it could never happen? What convinces us that this could never happen is just as equal to what grants us the right to consider the possibility that this could happen, it is all a matter of belief. Yes, I belief that there is more reason to believe one over the other, but on both sides of the issue, we only believe one or the other because we believe we know that there is or isn’t something on the other side of the present or in another dimension that would make our knowledge wrong. I believe that in both cases, man can be considered unwise, for he thinks he knows what he does not, but I am not too concerned with who is right and who is wrong, but with the fact that is is equally foolish of both sides to claim knowledge without being certain that in light of everything one can be sure that they are right and the other is wrong. This I believe means that whole playing field can no longer be as one sided as we falsely believed it could be, for human knowledge is the very same as belief, only the name is changed in order to appear, but not actually be sure.
If only Hume knew, that his ideas could lead to the eventual equality of faith and knowledge in the realms of truth, for it is ironic that the he who fought against miracles and faith, laid a foundation from which faith could be established as man’s only capability and where miracles could continue to be immune from being inducted into implausibility.
My goal was never to remove rights that we do have, but remind us that we are making statements from positions that we have no right to reside in. I believe it will be impossible to remove man from a place he believes is justly deserved even when his residence in his undeserved location is contemptible. Then again, I am not certain, but only uncertain that this is impossible, for if I was certain then I would justly have the right to say that I know rather than simply believe.
Final Statements
This paper I believe I made much too long, but I hope throughout all of it, that you enjoyed my thoughts.
I believe the irony, yet the beauty of philosophy is that we write our views believing full well that we will not resolve the issue, but only further it’s discussion. It seems as if we almost subconsciously desire this effect in performing the very act of expressing our ideas in writing, for maybe this desire stems from the desire to communicate to others our ideas and also to hear theirs as well. So thank you for granting me this opportunity to express my ideas. ~Steven Sleight~
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